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ABSTRACT 
This paper comparatively examines three different ethnonationalist movements: the alt-right in the 
United States; Zionists in Israel, with a focus on right-wing Zionists; and Maronite Christian 
ethnonationalists in Lebanon. Scholars have put forth important analyses of the alliance between the 
alt-right and Zionists, yet not many have grappled with the existence of similar strands of 
ethnonationalist ideology in Lebanon or the history of cooperation that exists between Zionists and 
Maronite ethnonationalists, or even the alliance between the alt-right and right-wing Lebanese 
Maronites in the Arab-American diaspora. This comparative analysis strives to add to existing 
analyses of right-wing ethnonationalist ideologies in the Middle East and United States, and to move 
away from the tendency to paint the alt-right and other right-wing movements worldwide with a 
broad brush.  
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INTRODUCTION 
hile progressive parties and grassroots activists watched in horror as Donald 
Trump prepared to take his seat in the White House at the end of 2016, right-wing 
ethnonationalist parties across the world seemed to rejoice. The Trump campaign had been 
notoriously providing a platform for right-wing ethnonationalists, popularly known as the 
‘alternative right,’ or the alt-right, to highlight their ideas within virtual and physical right-
wing spaces. However, as this paper will show, the alliance between Trump and these right-
wing ethnonationalist elements is not so clear-cut, just as the alliance between the alt-right 
and other elements within the global right is not as simple as many believe it to be.1 
                                                             
1 For example, many alt-right figures turned to Trump because they believed that he might reduce the expansionism 
promulgated by neoconservative and neoliberal elements in the White House over the last two decades. During 
campaign season, Trump’s foreign policy seemed murky. However, his appointment of figures such as Jeff Sessions as 
Attorney General and David Friedman as the United States’ ambassador to Israel should have given these alt-rightists a 
W 
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 The alt-right framed itself as a dissident right, one that had been working quietly 
since the lead-up to 9/11. Its ideological and strategic mobilization began as a response to 
neoconservatism following the Reagan years. While neoconservatives clamored for 
aggressive foreign policy, military interventionism, and a close alliance with Israel in the 
elite ranks of the Republican Party, the dissident right – who called themselves 
‘paleoconservatives’ – rallied against these policies. They claimed that neoconservatives 
were “closet Leftists” and “usurpers” (Lyons 2017, 3). In the lead-up to the election of Donald 
Trump, these reactionary, ethnonationalist elements used contemporary means to 
embolden their base and recruit new followers. By the 2016 election, the ‘alt-right’ 
catapulted to the mainstream, uniting behind Donald Trump’s divisive rhetoric on 
marginalized communities and his promises to “drain the swamp,” meaning to rid 
Washington of bloat and corruption. While some alt-right figures criticized aspects of 
Trump’s proposed policies, many believed that voting him into the White House was the 
right way to propel paleoconservative ideals and policies to the forefront of the political 
establishment. 
 These diversions from the Trump campaign’s purported stances are crucial to note. 
The ideological currents that unite people under the banner of ‘alt-right’ are not as novel 
as many believe them to be. They have their roots in ideals of racial supremacy and purity, 
hyper-nationalism, and isolationism. Such ideals are recurrent; they are not unique to the 
United States, or even to North America or the West in general. Indeed, Zionist and 
Maronite nationalisms are fundamentally Western; both emerged either directly from the 
West or in collaboration with Western actors. In the case of Zionism, Theodore Herzl’s call 
to create “an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism” (1896) follows in line with 
[Western] settler colonial logics that existed in his day, and follows a similar model to the 
settlement and colonization of lands in North America, South Africa, and Oceania. 
Ideologues of Maronite nationalism established connections to the Phoenicians that settled 
in parts of the Levant centuries ago to legitimize their claim on the land as a ‘refuge’ for 
                                                             
stark indication that his foreign policy might prove hostile. Even so, they were just as likely to throw support behind 
him, for reasons that will be explored later in this paper. 
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Christian Lebanese. Indeed, in tracing the origin of ‘Phoenicianist’ discourse, El Husseini 
finds that the ‘Phoenicianist’ discourse of Lebanese identity was adopted by Christian 
(primarily Maronite) intellectuals at the time of the creation of Greater Lebanon. The 
Maronites’ stated goal of establishing a Christian refuge in the Middle East was instrumental 
in convincing French authorities to designate Lebanon as a separate nation-state. The 
origin myth adopted by the Christian advocates involved a purportedly independent 
cultural legacy that was said to have existed in Lebanon since ancient times (El Husseini 
2012). 
 Thus, Zionist ideology clearly follows in the Western tradition of colonizing and 
settling lands beyond the metropole, for both strategic reasons (‘establishing an outpost of 
civilization against barbarism’) and religious origin myths (Palestine is the promised land 
of the Jewish people). In similar fashion, Maronite nationalism traces its roots back to the 
establishment of a cultural origin myth (the Phoenician ties to Maronite Christians). At the 
same time, the establishment of this origin myth came in conjunction with their alliance 
with the French, who ultimately carved Lebanon out of Mandate Syria and established it as 
its own mandate. Both these ideologies fall in line behind North American settler ideologies 
of the 16th and 17th century, which also used religious and strategic justifications for the 
settlement of the land.2 Contemporary Zionist and Maronite movements show similar 
ethnonationalist elements, with current political parties with an allegiance to these 
ideologies professing some form of commitment to establishing and maintaining 
homogeneous ethnostates.  
 The main tenets that unite these ideologies with alt-right ideologies transnationally 
are isolationism, hypernationalism, and an obsession with racial purity and demography. 
Where neoconservatives rally behind aggressive interventionist foreign policies, the 
dissident right clamor behind isolationist, exclusivist policies. Donald Trump’s violence 
towards the marginalized attracted the alt-right based on an ideology of ‘America First,’ of 
bringing capital, resources, troops, and so forth ‘back home’ – an unreconstructed nativism, 
                                                             
2 Beyond the scope of this paper, but these narratives were later weaponized for nationalist purposes, much like the 
Zionist and Maronite nationalist iterations discussed above. 
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in essence. This is not a novel concept. In Israel, one of the forefathers of the right-wing 
Likud party, Vladimir Jabotinsky, championed an “iron wall” that would keep Palestinians 
out of “Jewish land” and allow the efforts of Zionist colonization to continue (Jabotinsky 
1923). Today, the Likud party continues in a similar trajectory to appease the far-right 
elements of its base, much like the Republican Party in the US. In Lebanon, the resonances 
in contemporary political parties is murkier; however, the ideological conception of the 
country as a ‘Christian refuge’ by some right-wing elements that still operate today parallels 
the notion of Israel as a Jewish refuge (Pappe 2014), and the alt-right’s conception of a 
decentralized United States with a hierarchy ordered according to race (Lyons 2017).  
Indeed, the resonances between these notions of hypernationalism and racial purity, 
which are geographically removed from one another, are so great that they have been 
referenced in relation to each other. Richard Spencer, one of the primary figures associated 
with the alt-right, has constantly referred to his beliefs as a form of “white Zionism” 
(Abunimah 2017), claiming that ethno-states have “moral legitimacy.” Further, during the 
Lebanese Civil War, which lasted for more than a decade, one of the many federal plans 
circulated by ideologues to stakeholders in the war “sold [Christian Lebanon] to the US 
ambassador as a second Israel with all the benefits for the US of the first, minus its 
inconveniences (meaning that it would be accepted by the Arab world)” (Traboulsi 2012, 
218).   
 In this context, a comparative analysis of different right-wing ethnonationalist 
movements’ reception of Trump’s foreign policy is crucial to understanding the nuances in 
what has been popularly dubbed ‘the alt-right.’ While there is a tendency to paint the alt-
right with a broad brush, we must acknowledge and understand the historical and 
ideological convergences and divergences embodied by different ethnonationalist parties 
worldwide.  
 In this paper, I aim to comparatively examine three different ethnonationalist 
movements: the alt-right in the United States; Zionists in Israel, with a focus on right-wing 
Zionists; and Maronite Christian ethnonationalists in Lebanon. Scholars have put forth 
important analyses of the alliance between the alt-right and Zionists, yet not many have 
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grappled with the existence of similar strands of ethnonationalist ideology in Lebanon or 
the history of cooperation that exists between Zionists and Maronite ethnonationalists, or 
even the alliance between the alt-right and right-wing Lebanese Maronites in the Arab-
American diaspora. This comparative analysis strives to add to existing analyses of right-
wing ethnonationalist ideologies in the Middle East and United States.  
 These three groups converge and diverge from each other in myriad ways. One 
interesting departure point, that I do not analyze in this paper, is the means of 
mobilization; since the parties I analyze in this paper came to prominence in different time 
periods, the means of mobilization and recruitment have varied accordingly. For example, 
the alt-right’s primary means of recruitment and mobilization has been through virtual 
space; this space was not necessarily accessible at the height of some of the events I discuss 
in this paper. Although the recruitment of members and the mobilization of the alt-right 
has taken and is currently taking place in virtual spaces, the purpose of this article is to 
look at the transnational connections between alt-right, Zionist, and Maronite nationalist 
movements, rather than narrow in on the particular means of recruitment and mobilization 
utilized by each party. Indeed, this could be a potential topic for further studies in the 
future.  
For the purposes of this paper, I aim to study these groups’ reception of Trump’s 
decision to move the United States’ embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. I argue that their widely 
diverging stances on this issue stem from a similar, hypernationalist identitarian rationale, 
one that dominates the contemporary spirit of the alt-right in the United States and abroad.  
 This paper aims to contribute to existing analyses of right-wing, ethnonationalist 
groups across the globe in the context of the growing alt-right in the United States. While 
these groups have always existed in different iterations, there is no doubt that the election 
and tenure of Donald Trump have brought to light other ethnonationalist groups beyond 
the geographic bounds of the United States. Figures like Walid Phares, Middle East advisor 
to Trump during his campaign year and a former advisor to Maronite ethnonationalist 
parties during the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s, are testament to the transnational 
nature of the alt-right. There have been analyses of the alt-right in the context of the United 
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States, of right-wing Zionism in the context of Israel, and of Maronite ethnonationalism in 
Lebanon. Some scholars have examined the relationship between Zionism and the alt-right, 
or Zionism and Maronite ethnonationalism; this paper aims to take their analyses a step 
further by putting the three geographic and historical contexts in conversation with one 
another, to add a new intervention to provocative and nuanced transnational analyses of 
right-wing ethnonationalism that already exist.  
ESTABLISHING TERMINOLOGIES AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. On Terminology 
The alt-right is often defined as ‘neo-fascist.’ Indeed, the alt-right deliberately evokes Nazi 
symbolism in their work and reiterate similar strands of antisemitism and xenophobia that 
were central to the ethos of the Nazi parties that existed in the interwar period. For 
example, The Daily Stormer, a media outlet that serves as a mouthpiece for the alt-right in 
the US, deliberately evokes the antisemitic Der Sturmer, an antisemitic paper that served 
as a mouthpiece for the Nazi party in the 1930s. The alt-right undoubtedly is committed to 
the circulation of neo-fascist ideas, formulated by the European New Right (ENR) of the 
late 1960s (Lyons 2017, 3; Griffin 2018, 116). Griffin notes that neo-fascism had undergone a 
“different, more intellectually high-brow sort of virtualization . . . promulgat[ing] a ‘right-
wing Gramscism.’” This ‘right-wing Gramscism’ dictated that postwar fascists should 
devote themselves to a “sustained campaign of metapolitics” (Griffin 2018, 117). The 
‘metapolitical’ strategy meant that they would operate outside the traditional realms of 
party politics, concentrating on “transforming political and intellectual culture as a 
precursor to transforming institutions and systems” (Lyons 2017, 3). 
However, it is simplistic to delineate the alt-right as being simply ‘neo-fascist.’ The 
movement’s ‘big-tent’ praxis allows it to incorporate the voices of right-wing anarchists, 
misogynistic anti-feminists and men’s rights activists [MRAs], and others who do not fall 
neatly under ‘neo-fascist’ lines. While the movement certainly draws from fascist ideas, the 
movement is not itself neo-fascist. In fact, many who identify with the alt-right do not 
envision themselves as fascists, especially not in the traditional sense of the word, or even 
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as neo-fascists. Many claim that their invocation of Nazi imagery is ironic; meant to mock 
those that call them neo-Nazis or neo-fascists. The ENR were opposed to being defined as 
fascists themselves, and actively disengaged from traditional elements of fascism such as 
expansionism. Much like their descendants in the alt-right, they advocated federalism, 
claiming that a federation of ethnically homogeneous communities was preferable to a 
centralized state (Lyons 2017, 3). Their ideological descendants in the alt-right have also 
moved to actively disengage themselves from old-school fascism, with publications such as 
American Renaissance even pioneering a version of white nationalism that moved away 
from recognizable forms of antisemitism and even welcomed Jewish thinkers whose ideas 
are palatable in the alt-right sphere. This means that an apparent softening of antisemitic 
rhetoric has become strategically sound for the alt-right. 
It is this fundamental tenet of ENR and alt-right philosophy that I aim to focus on 
in this paper. For this purpose, I have moved away from terms like ‘fascist’ and ‘neo-fascist’ 
and towards terms like ‘ethnonationalism,’ for it is the notion of an ethnically 
homogeneous nation that ties elements of the alt-right with elements of Zionism and 
Phalangism (Lebanese Christian nationalism). Further, collapsing the three movements 
under the umbrella of ‘fascism’ or ‘neo-fascism’ threatens to obfuscate the virulent 
antisemitism rife in the alt-right movement. Indeed, these neo-fascist elements have often 
masked their antisemitism as anti-Zionism and solidarity with Palestinians (Ross 2017). To 
avoid falling into the trap of reifying these conflations, which have been taken up by 
Zionists to delegitimize Palestinian solidarity, I use the narrower and more accurate term 
‘ethnonationalism’ and ‘ethnostate’ to signal the forms of hypernationalism and ideas of 
racial supremacy that I am referring to in this paper. This is not because I do not believe 
that these movements incorporate elements of fascism into their organizing strategy and 
ideological foundations. Rather, it is because ethnonationalist is a narrower delineation of 
the ideologies I identify and analyze. Further, as Griffin notes in his book on fascism, “the 
way journalists and politicians bandy the term ‘fascism’ around does not help create a sober 
atmosphere of forensic inquiry” (Griffin 2017, 95), meaning that the term has been 
construed as broad enough to encompass any form of anti-left authoritarianism. While this 
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paper does deal with movements that are largely anti-left and authoritarian, it is not these 
aspects of their ideologies and platforms that I am interested in for the purpose of this 
paper.   
These movements’ ardent dedication to different ethnostates leads to the formation 
of seemingly unexpected strategic alliances. When Richard Spencer, a prominent ideologue 
of the alt-right, professes his admiration for the State of Israel, he is professing an affinity 
with the ethnonationalist ideology that drives most, if not all, of the Israeli government’s 
policies. When the Israeli government aligned itself with the Phalange of Lebanon during 
the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s, helping them carry out a massacre of Palestinian 
refugees at Sabra and Shatila, their purpose was twofold (Pappe 2006, 219). First, they were 
professing an affinity with the notion of another ethnocratic ‘refuge’ in the Middle East. 
Second, they were also attempting to exterminate their own Other; the ‘Palestinian 
problem’ that had taken root in Lebanon, one that was construed as an existential threat 
by both the Christian Lebanese Phalange and the Zionists.  
For it is these ideas of hypernationalism and racial supremacy, delineated in the idea 
of ethnically homogeneous nations, that thread the movements I discuss in this paper 
together. The primary difference is the degree to which these movements managed, or are 
managing, a takeover of the state for the purpose of protecting identitarian interests and 
eliminating ‘the Other.’ One difference lies in their delineation of the ‘Other;’ different 
movements have different sources of existential fear. However, this fear is always projected 
onto a constructed ‘Other.’ For ethnonationalist Zionists, this Othering has always been 
directed towards Palestinians, who are indigenous to the land Zionists aim to settle. More 
recently, Jewish Ethiopians have also been subject to violent exclusion in Israel; in 2013, 
scandal broke when it was revealed that the Israeli government had been forcibly sterilizing 
African migrants, including Ethiopian Jews.  
To Lebanese Christian nationalists, who believe that Lebanon should either be a 
juridically Christian nation or that Christians should be allowed to secede from Lebanon, 
the Palestinian refugee, and more recently the Syrian refugee, is the scourge to be 
exterminated from its society. This point is most notably shown in the platform of the 
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Kataeb (Phalangist) party released in March 2018. Under section C, point 13, the Phalangists 
commit to: 
 
the Arab Peace Initiative (Beirut Declaration 2002) and to the international resolutions 
pertaining to the Palestinian cause which is considered as righteous. Launching an 
international conference that would focus on the issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 
while making sure that talks are based on their right to return to their homeland and the 
rejection of their naturalization, and working on a comprehensive plan to share this burden 
by all friendly countries until the Palestinians return home.3 (Kataeb 2018) 
 
Here, the emphasis is placed on ensuring that the Palestinians are granted the right to 
return to Palestine, not due to any political sense of obligation towards the Palestinian 
cause, but rather to ensure that Palestinians are removed from ‘Lebanese land.’ The 
platform also reveals a similar attitude towards the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, who the 
party claims must be “resettled to Arab countries who need [them as a labor force].” Such 
positions are not limited to the Phalangist party. White nationalists within the alt-right 
overwhelmingly view Jewish people as one of the primary Others within the white nation. 
Interestingly, however, tolerance of Jewish presence in ‘white homelands’ has increased due 
to what has been deemed as the ‘common enemy:’ “The brown, black, and yellow 
multitudes” (Trifkovic, quoted in Lyons 2017, 7). One alt-right thinker, M.K. Lane, even 
claimed that Jewish people should ally with white nationalists because “if we [whites] go 
down, they [Jewish people] go down” (Lane, quoted in Lyons 2017, 7). This increased 
tolerance has also manifested in an acceptance of Israel as a Jewish homeland, to the extent 
that some have cited it as an example to emulate. Richard B. Spencer4 has repeatedly 
referred to himself as a ‘white Zionist’ and to his ideas as ‘white Zionism.ʼ The white 
nationalist affinity with Zionism is most notably displayed in a 2016 exchange at Texas A&M 
between Spencer and Rabbi Rosenberg, an audience member who challenged Spencer’s 
                                                             
3 Emphasis added. 
4 Richard Bertrand Spencer is an American white supremacist. He is the president of the National Policy Institute, a 
white supremacist think tank, and of Washington Summit Publishers, a white nationalist publisher which publishes 
books on race as well as racist and racialist content supportive of white nationalism. Rejecting the label of white 
supremacist, Spencer defines himself a white nationalist, white identitarian, and the equivalent of a “Zionist” for white 
people. He created the term alt-right, a movement about white identity, and advocates white-European unity and a 
“peaceful ethnic cleansing” of nonwhites from America, as well as the creation of a new political order he believes would 
resemble the Roman Empire. 
| Ethnonationalism in the U.S., Lebanon, and Israel 
 
JAm It! No. 1 May 2019 | Nationalism: Hyper and Post                                                                                107 
racism: “You come here with a message of radical exclusion. My tradition teaches a message 
of radical inclusion, as embodied by Torah,” said Rosenberg, who attended the media event 
at the urging of one of his colleagues. “Would you sit down and study Torah with me and 
learn love?” Spencer shot back by comparing Israel’s vision as a homeland for Jews with his 
own goals for a state for whites. “Do you really want radical inclusion into the State of 
Israel?” Spencer responded, as Rosenberg said nothing. “Jews exist precisely because you 
did not assimilate to the gentiles . . . I respect that about you. I want my people to have that 
same sense of themselves” (Solomon 2016). 
 Much like the Phalangist Party’s delineation of the Palestinian cause as ‘righteous’ 
(see above), Spencer and other alt-right thinkers of similar stature claim that the existence 
of Israel as a state for the Jewish people holds “moral legitimacy,” due to its self-delineation 
as a homogeneous ethnostate. At the same time, they claim that Jewish people are 
“remorseless enemies who seek [their] destruction” (Auschwitz Soccer Ref, quoted in Lyons 
2017, 7) who have the power to “subvert [white] societies” (Lane, quoted in Lyons 2017, 7). 
To these ethnonationalists, an investment in the notion of isolationism, to the 
extent where some (such as the ENR) advocate anti-imperialism rather than expansionism, 
is crucial to guaranteeing the sanctity of the ethnostate. What this means is that these 
right-wing elements advocate for ‘anti-imperialism’ not in a radical leftist sense, where 
equality or justice are defining characteristics of their opposition to imperialism, but rather 
to preserve capital used for expansionist purposes for the benefit of those who fit the 
criteria of belonging to the ethnostate. Much like the majority of Israeli citizens who 
protested the 1982 invasion of Beirut, and the overall Israeli involvement in the Lebanese 
Civil War, this ‘anti-imperialism’ is more concerned with “self-image” (Pappe 2006, 220) 
and the deaths of soldiers in the invading army than with victims in the region being 
invaded. This partially explains why Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric and promise 
to build a wall to keep Others out appeals so much to individuals in the alt-right. Both hold 
the promise of keeping resources concentrated in the ethnostate. This holds true for both 
Phalangists (as noted earlier) and right-wing Zionists. There is one caveat when it comes 
to delineating these groups’ anti-expansionism: Israeli settlement-building, which has gone 
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on for decades now. The question of settlements is interesting because it is a form of 
expansionism that usually runs contrary to the ‘anti-imperialist’ or ‘anti-expansionist’ 
stance of the ethnonationalists I study in this paper. However, to right-wing Zionists, 
building settlements is not necessarily a question of expansion into foreign territory; 
indeed, settlements are deemed to be a reclamation of territory lost, rather than expansion 
into new lands, which is why it does not fall under the alt-right understanding of 
expansionism or imperialism, which can be defined as intervention into foreign nations’ 
affairs (such as, for example, the invasion of Iraq, which most alt-rightists would have been 
opposed to on the basis that it was a neoconservative waste of resources that could be used 
to preserve the white ethnostate). At the same time, isolationism is not intrinsic to 
ethnonationalist fervor; indeed, isolationist and expansionist policies are both pursued as 
long as they preserve the sanctity of the ethnostate. 
Finally, there is some contention surrounding the collapse of ethnicity and religion 
in the notion of ethnocentrism or ethnostates. In this paper, I use the term 
ethnonationalism rather than any other term that references the religious aspect of these 
forms of ethnonationalism (like the Christian justifications for a Christian refuge in 
Lebanon or a white ethnostate in North America, or the notion of Palestine being a 
‘promised land’ for the Jewish people according to the Torah). These ethnocratic or 
ethnonationalist movements use religion as a smokescreen to justify the establishment of 
an ethnostate, but those within the ethnostate are not necessarily equally aligned by their 
profession to Christianity or Judaism.5 Rather, it is ethnic or racial factors, such as the color 
of their skin or the language they speak, or any other element that could single them out 
as Others in the ethnostate.6 We see this in the discrimination faced by Ethiopian Jews or 
even Mizrahi Jews in Israel, the self-professed refuge for all Jewish people across the world, 
or in the ethnonationalist alt-right’s desire for a white ethnostate, that would be culturally 
                                                             
5 See the “cleansing operation” of the Christian Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon in Section 1B of this paper, 
“Historical Background and Contemporary ‘Alliances.’” 
6 The work of scholars like Ronit Lentin and Benedict Anderson, among many others, have provided a rich backdrop for 
me to write within. However, this is a widely-debated subject that is beyond the scope of this paper, which is why I do 
not expand further on it here. 
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Christian i.e. exclude people with white skin who do not profess some affinity with 
Christian religion or culture (such as white Jewish people). Even the Phalange, who claim 
to desire a Christian refuge for all Christians in the Middle East, clearly express their affinity 
with Lebanism, or Lebanese exceptionalism, as seen in cases where Palestinian Christians 
or Syrian Christians are rejected by the Maronite Lebanese for being national ‘Others.’ This 
is not to say that ethnonationalists do not prioritize religion in any way. However, 
‘ethnicity’ more accurately identifies the priorities of the thinkers behind the notion of 
ethnonationalism.   
B. Historical Background and Contemporary ‘Alliances’ 
On 13 April 1975, shots were fired from a car at a congregation of Phalange partisans in front 
of a church in ‘Ayn al Rummaneh, wounding a number of people. Phalangist militiamen 
reacted a few hours later by machine-gunning a bus heading for the Tall al-Za’tar refugee 
camp, killing 21 Palestinians. Fighting broke out throughout the southeastern suburb of 
Beirut between the Phalange and the Palestinian resistance and their Lebanese allies. A war 
that was to last for 15 years had just begun. (Traboulsi 2012, 189) 
Soon after the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, a writer for Al ‘Amal, the 
Phalange media mouthpiece, claimed that “the political domination of the Maronites was 
the only guarantee of protection for a minority condemned to oppression by a majority that 
was oppressive by its very nature” (Traboulsi 2012, 195). The political domination of the 
Maronites, in practical terms, referred to the fact that that the Lebanese parliament 
represented Christians to Muslims at a ratio of six to five and to the fact that the presidency 
could (and can, to this day) only be held by a Maronite.  
In 1980, Bachir Gemayel, one of the primary figures of the right-wing Phalange, was 
devising a plot to “establish decisive Christian control over the [Lebanese] state” (Traboulsi 
2012, 217). Several plans, set up by different advisors to Gemayel, were circulated internally. 
One of these plans, drafted by Karim Pakradoni and Joseph Abu Khalil, sold “Christian 
Lebanon . . . to the US ambassador as a second Israel with all the benefits for the US of the 
first, minus its inconveniences (meaning that it would be accepted by the Arab world)” 
(Traboulsi 2012, 218). The parallel between Lebanon and Israel in the imagination of right-
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wing elements was no coincidence. Indeed, even when Lebanon was under French 
mandatory power, a vocal group of Christians, who formed a political front called the 
National Bloc, even “demanded that Lebanon be made a national home for the Christians 
under French protection, just as Palestine was to be made a national home for the Jews” 
(Salibi 1988).  
The alliance between the Phalange and the Zionists extended beyond the 
metanarratives that existed about Lebanon and Israel as refuges of the Christians and the 
Jewish people. The Phalangist-Zionist alliance was a primary factor in the continuation of 
the civil war, especially during its second phase (1977-1982). On the 20th of March 1980, Al 
‘Amal responded to calls for peace and national unity by declaring that “there would never 
be Lebanese unity as long as half a million Palestinians were on Lebanese territory” (quoted 
in Traboulsi 2012, 217). On the Israeli side, one of the Likud’s primary motivations for 
involvement in Lebanese affairs was the desire to eradicate the ‘Palestinian problem’ by 
force (Pappe 2006, 219). Indeed, this is where the interests of the Phalange and the Zionists 
collide; both shared the view that the ‘Palestinian problem’ was one to be eradicated by 
force. This coincidence of interests led the Israeli government to intervene and ensure a 
Phalange takeover of the Lebanese government at all costs. Traboulsi notes that Walid 
Jumblatt, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (an ally of the Palestinian resistance), 
referred to Gemayel as “the candidate of the Israeli tanks” (Traboulsi 2012, 222) soon after 
his takeover of the Lebanese government. Indeed, the Israeli invasion and occupation of 
Lebanon had been intended to “install a Maronite pro-Israeli government in Lebanon and 
destroy the PLO” (Pappe 2006, 219). Soon after his election to the presidency, Gemayel had 
been ‘forced’ to meet with Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister of Israel at the time,7 and 
sign off on an agreement to normalize relations between Lebanon and Israel.  
Palestinian refugees were the primary victims in the war (Pappe 2006, 220). As 
Edward Said notes:  “Israel’s war was designed to reduce Palestinian existence as much as 
possible. Most Israeli leaders and newspapers admitted the war's political motive. In Rafael 
                                                             
7 Begin was a leader of the Zionist militant group Irgun, which was a predecessor of the Likud Party. 
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Eitan’s words, to destroy Palestinian nationalism and institutions in Lebanon would make 
it easier to destroy them on the West Bank and in Gaza: Palestinians were to be turned into 
drugged roaches in a bottleˮ (Said 1984, 29). Israel’s role in the massacre of Sabra and 
Shatila, and the Lebanese Civil War more broadly, is undeniable. However, it is more 
accurate to specify that Palestinian refugees were the primary victims of the Phalange-
Zionist alliance. 
The Phalange had started what they called ‘cleansing operations’ of Palestinian 
refugee camps as early as 1975, starting with the al-Dhubayeh Palestinian Christian refugee 
camp. Interestingly, this case affirms that the Phalange were not simply interested in 
religious homogeneity, but rather in ethnoreligious similarity, with a prioritization of 
national belonging to the imagined community of Lebanon.  
By 1982, following Gemayel’s assassination, the Phalange had carried out an 
internationally condemned massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, 
aided and abetted by the Israeli troops who were ostensibly present in West Beirut to 
preserve peace. The Israeli army’s monthly journal, Skira Hodechith, commented that “the 
Christians [Phalangists] wanted thus to create a new demographic balance in Lebanon” 
(quoted in Traboulsi 2012, 225). Thus, in 1982, the ethnonationalist ideology of the Phalange 
and of the Zionists led to a strategic alliance that aimed to exterminate the Palestinian 
‘problem’ and create a new hegemonic order in the Middle East. This new order would 
allow for the creation of a Lebanese ethnostate bordering Palestine, one which did not have 
to deal with the demographic threat posed by Palestinians any longer.  
The notion of demographic threats is not new in Zionist thought; indeed, 
Palestinians have been framed as an “existential demographic threat” to Israel’s existence 
as a Jewish state since its establishment (Oren 2009). Similarly, in 1980s Lebanon – and 
even today, as noted earlier – Palestinian refugees, Syrian refugees, and other demographics 
from Muslim-majority areas were seen as a demographic threat to Lebanon’s existence as 
a supposed Christian refuge in the Middle East. This, along with ideological overlaps 
between the two, is what led to the alliance between the Zionists and the Christian 
Phalange in the 1980s. The ideological overlaps exist to this day, and indeed, I would posit 
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that the Christian Phalange and their allies are the most likely to be sympathetic to alt-
right hypernationalism and notions of racial supremacy that permeate the current global 
right. While there have been no explicit policy positions expressing any form of overt 
alliance with the alt-right, which is a relatively new movement compared to the older 
Christian Phalange and their allies, ideologically there are too many similarities to deny 
that they would not, to some degree, ally strategically with one another.  
One figure who exhibits the ideological overlap between these right-wing elements 
is the right-wing pundit Walid Phares, one of Trump’s 2016 campaign advisors. Phares is 
notorious for his past as an ideologue of the Christian coalition dominated by the Phalange 
in the 1980s. According to Ben Lynfield of The Jerusalem Post, “Phares trained Lebanese 
militants in ideological beliefs justifying the war against Lebanon’s Muslim and Druse [sic] 
factions . . . [he] advocated that Lebanon’s Christians work toward creating a separate, 
independent Christian enclave” (Lynfield 2016). Phares has long advocated for ethnostates 
in the Middle East, which he calls “Christian enclaves” (Phares 2001). He refers to his 
envisioned Christian enclave in Lebanon as “Petit Liban.” While his views on Christian 
enclaves might have changed between 2001 to today, it is clear from his time serving as a 
campaign advisor to Mitt Romney in 2012 as well as Donald Trump in 2016 that his stances 
on Islam in the region have not, and it is clear that he still holds a pro-Israel stance partially 
because he views them as a potential ally in the fight to establish Christian enclaves in the 
Middle East. He claims that Israel’s support dwindled between 1985 and 2000 to appease 
the U.S. government; he then claims that Christians in the Middle East must attempt to 
reverse the dwindling Western support for Christian enclaves by presenting a “united front” 
in the international community and a “tragic story of [their status] as an underdog nation” 
to Western and U.S. audiences in order to garner support.  
However, Phares’ (and other Christian Lebanese pundits) commitment to the 
notion of Christian enclaves should not allow us to automatically assume that there is an 
overt alliance between the Christian Phalangists, right-wing Zionists, and the alt-right. To 
do so would be a far reach, especially considering the suspicion with which some figures in 
the alt-right approach Donald Trump and his selection of advisors, sometimes referred to 
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as the Alt Lite. The Alt Lite, as defined by Lyons, is a “wider circle of sympathizers and 
populizers” of the alt-right (2017, 13). Figures close to Donald Trump, like Steve Bannon or 
even Milo Yiannopoulous, are considered ‘alt-lite’ figures by many in the alt-right. 
Interestingly, Breitbart News Network, which is considered the paragon of alt-lite politics 
(Lyons 2017, 16), has hosted articles by Phares on Middle East affairs in the past. While a 
minority of alt-righters are suspicious of the Trump administration and those within it, 
Lyons notes that these figures are “squarely in the minority” (Lyons 2017, 15).  
At the same time, the Trump administration and the alt-right are not one and the 
same; rather, their alliance is symbiotic, much like the alt-right’s fraught alliance with 
Zionists and other hardline right-wingers. At The Right Stuff, another alt-right blog, 
‘Professor Evola-Hitler’ argued that “[we] need to be taking advantage of Trump, not allow 
Trump to take advantage of us” (quoted in Lyons 2017, 14). In an essay about Trump’s 
Zionism, known anti-semite Kevin MacDonald argues that “for . . . advocates of a White 
America, our first priorities should be domestic policy – ending the immigration onslaught 
first and foremost. If doing that is made easier by [allying with Trump and] supporting 
Israel, so be it” (MacDonald 2016). In 2016, Richard Spencer, notorious for calling himself a 
‘white Zionist,’ tweeted: “We need a foreign policy that doesn't treat Israel as if it were 
America's 51st state. #AmericaFirst” (Spencer 2016).  
These quotes adequately sum up the relationship between the Trump 
administration and the alt-right, who see Trump as a mean to an end, and who see their 
alliance with Zionists as a strategic one, based on similar interests, rather than a moral or 
ethical one. Indeed, Trump’s pro-Israel policies have been a point of departure between 
him and many in the alt-right, who either advocate ‘America First’ foreign policy that 
involves cutting aid to Israel and investing those resources in the ethnostate, or those who 
are antisemitic and believe that the White House is controlled by ‘the Jewish 
establishment.’  
Regardless of these points of departure, the alt-right were willing to throw their 
support behind Trump in 2016, claiming that he would be a ‘lesser evil’ than Clinton and 
coming to terms with the differences that would appear once Trump was in the White 
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House. In a similar fashion, when the Likud took control of the Israeli government in the 
late 70s, it was due to a coalition of right-wing groups. These right-wing groups (National 
Religious Party, Agudat Israel, and Shlomotzion) did not necessarily see eye-to-eye with 
the Likud on several issues; however, any difference can easily be overlooked “in order to 
obtain the necessary amount of seats for a majority government” (Bsisu 2012, 31). Again, the 
strategic element of these alliances is clear; for all these parties, the expansion of 
settlements was a cornerstone of the alliance, as well as the ‘threat’ of Palestinian existence. 
As Bsisu notes, “nothing united the Israelis [especially those on the right] like the threat, 
whether real or imagined, of Palestinian aggression” (Bsisu 2012, 33).  
In sum, while the figures of these different movements may eye each other (and 
even other individuals within their own movements) with suspicion, the ideological 
overlaps vis-a-vis the notion of ethnonationalism cannot be denied. The alt-right, Zionists, 
and Phalangists all lean to some degree towards the establishment of ethnostates. All 
believe, to some degree, that they belong to a persecuted ethnoreligious class in their 
geographical contexts, and all believe that the state should mobilize their resources not 
towards imperial expansion but rather towards bettering the conditions of those belonging 
to the ethnostate. This is a fundamental tenet of these parties’ stances towards different 
phenomena, which I will elaborate upon in the next section.  
THE EMBASSY MOVE 
Trump’s decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem indicated a marked shift 
from previous administrations’ stances on the issue. Indeed, the decision has been lauded 
and criticized in equal measure. As mentioned previously, those in the alt-right who 
advocate an ‘America First’ foreign policy or hold the antisemitic belief that the ‘Jewish 
establishment’ controls the White House have a fraught yet strategic relationship with 
Zionism. On the one hand, Zionism is ideologically appealing to figures like Richard 
Spencer, who calls himself a ‘white Zionist;’ the notion of ethnoreligious enclaves, as I 
established above, falls in line with the alt-right’s white ethnonationalism. On the other, 
the alt-right sees Israel as a representation of two undesirable elements in politics. First, 
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the strong U.S.-Israel alliance is seen primarily as the result of neoconservative 
interventionism and expansionism, whereby U.S. resources and capital that could be used 
to preserve and develop the white ethnostate are sent to Israel. Second, the anti-semites in 
the alt-right see the growth of Israel as a direct result of the ‘Jewish establishment’s’ firm 
grip on the White House. The first view is primarily pushed by proponents of ‘America 
First’ nativism, and the second is pushed by antisemites who exaggerate the influence of 
Zionism on the White House. Both stem from an ethnonationalist point of view; indeed, 
antisemitism in the alt-right, as discussed previously, stems from an avid desire to preserve 
the sanctity of the white ethnostate. Jewish people have usually been represented as part 
of an elite dedicated to subverting and destroying ‘white culture’ (see section 1A of this 
paper, “On Terminology”). Further, the view that the U.S. should not provide Israel with 
any foreign aid stems from ‘America First’-ism, whereby ‘America’ is envisioned as the 
ethnostate for white descendants of Europe in North America.  
 In Lebanon, the decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem was met 
with equal derision by some right-wing elements, many of whom adhere to the two-state 
solution in their policy stances. While the Kataeb Party has mellowed in recent years, other 
adherents to hypernationalist ideology, such as the Free Patriotic Movement’s8 Gebran 
Bassil (who is currently the foreign minister of Lebanon), condemned the decision, even 
claiming in an Arab League meeting that economic sanctions should be placed on the U.S. 
(Hayward 2017). Some may argue that this is unusual for Bassil, who recently faced backlash 
after remarks about having no ideological qualms with Israel and affirming “Israel’s right 
to safety” (Bassil 2017). However, it falls in line with the ethnonationalist stance represented 
by the Kataeb Party and others with a similar ideological orientation. Many hard-line right-
wing Christian ethnonationalists in Lebanon support Palestinians’ right of return as the 
primary way to ensure that they would return home and leave Lebanon; thus, Trump’s 
decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem is seen as an impediment to that 
                                                             
8 The Free Patriotic Movement is allied with Hezbollah; however, they share many similar ideological stances with the 
Kataeb party, such as Christian nationalism. Former allies of the Kataeb Party from the time of the civil war are part of 
the FPM. One prominent figure is the country’s current president Michel Aoun, who was one thinker behind the many 
plans that mapped out Bachir Gemayel’s coup in 1982; he is the founder and former leader of the FPM. 
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process. Like many alt-rightists who support Israel as a means to move Jewish people 
outside what they perceive to be their rightful “white” ethnostate homeland, many 
Lebanese right-wingers support the Palestinian right of return (and to some degree, the 
Palestinian cause for liberation) simply as a mean to move Palestinians beyond Lebanon’s 
borders. To these people, much like alt-right figures in the U.S., the U.S.’s firm alliance with 
Israel is an impediment to the Lebanese state’s ability to expend resources on the Libano-
Christian ethnostate, since it impedes the process of removing Palestinians (always 
implicitly seen as “Muslim”) from the “only Christian refuge in the Middle East.” 
 Meanwhile, in Israel, the move was (unsurprisingly) lauded by many right-wing 
figures. As many scholars, analysts, and journalists have noted, the move consolidates the 
Israeli state’s claim that Jerusalem is the undivided capital of Israel. Again, this firm pro-
move stance stems from the same ideological ethnonationalism discussed in the case of the 
Lebanese right and the U.S. alt-right respectively. In this scenario, the ethnostate is seen as 
wrongfully contested by the international community, and the Trump administration’s 
decision to challenge that contestation is thus an affirmation of the supposed legitimacy of 
the Jewish ethnostate. While these stances are wildly divergent from each other, there is 
no denying that they emerge from the same hypernationalist ethnoreligious dedication to 
the formation of a homogeneous ethnostate, whereby anyone who deviates from the 
majority ethnic creed or challenges the ethnostate’s investment in its own people is 
violently ostracized and expelled.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper identifies the ideological overlaps between the alt-right, Zionists, and Maronite 
nationalists in the U.S., Israel, and Lebanon respectively, drawing attention to the historical 
alliance between Zionists and Maronite nationalists and the tentative alliance between alt-
rightists (who draw on historically antisemitic ideology, mythology, and symbology) and 
Zionists. This paper attempts to prove that these three right-wing elements draw on similar 
notions of ethnonationalism and advocate for similar iterations of homogeneous 
ethnostates, albeit appealing to people of different “ethnicities.” Finally, using their 
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reception of Trump’s decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, I establish 
that while their stances on the issue were different, they stemmed from similar strands of 
ethnonationalist ideology and thought. 
The ideological overlaps and potential for strategic alliances between alt-rightists, 
Zionists, and Maronite nationalists will be crucial to identify and analyze in the years to 
come. Many of these overlaps have not led to overt alliances between alt-rightists and the 
Lebanese right, or even re-established overt alliances between the Lebanese Christian right 
and Zionists. However, the potential for strategic alliances between these right-wing 
elements is an imminent threat to the contexts within the geographies these movements 
operate in. On top of this, they represent the rightward shift of global politics, where 
advocating for ethnostates so overtly has become acceptable and even, in some places, 
representative of the status quo. In terms of American Studies, it is crucial to look at the 
sort of impact created by alt-right mobilizations, especially online.9 
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